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MANAGING CYBERTHREAT  
Lawrence J. Trautman† 
Cybersecurity is an important strategic and governance issue. 
However, most corporate CEOs and directors have no formal 
engineering or information technology training, which leads to a 
problematic lack of actual cybersecurity knowledge. Particularly in 
smaller companies with limited resources, knowledge regarding what 
their enterprise should actually be doing about cybersecurity isn’t all 
that good. 
My goal in this article is to explore the unusually complex subject 
of cybersecurity in a highly readable manner. First, I provide an 
examination of recent threats. Next, I discuss governmental policy 
initiatives. Third, I offer some basic tools that can be used by boards 
and top management to improve the quality of discussions with their 
information technology executives. It is likely that most top 
management and corporate directors have never heard of, let alone 
read: the SANS Critical Security Controls; OWASP Top Ten; 
CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors; Presidential 
Executive Order 13636 (& Treasury Dept. Report); Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review; or NIST Framework. By offering 
suggestions about what top managers and boards can do to improve 
organizational cybersecurity awareness and readiness, this paper 
makes a worthwhile contribution to the literature of risk management 
and provides meaningful progress in strengthening the knowledge base 
and ability of top management and boards to govern enterprise 
cybersecurity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity is an important strategic and governance issue.1 
However, most corporate CEOs and directors have no formal 
engineering or information technology training, which leads to a 
problematic lack of actual cybersecurity knowledge. Particularly in 
smaller companies with limited resources, knowledge regarding what 
their enterprise should actually be doing about cybersecurity isn’t all 
that good. 
Speaking at the New York Stock Exchange “Cyber Risks and the 
Boardroom” Conference, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar stated 
that “[o]ver just a relatively short period of time, cybersecurity has 
become a top concern of American companies, financial institutions, 
law enforcement, and many regulators.”2 Observing that “[l]aw 
																																								 																				
 1. See generally Susan P. Crawford, First Do No Harm: The Problem of Spyware, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 (2005) (discussing spyware legislation); Urs Gasser & Daniel M. 
Häusermann, E-Compliance: Towards a Roadmap for Effective Risk Management, (Mar. 15, 
2007), THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL § 3, 
(2007), (discussing internet risk management and maps a comprehensive e-compliance strategy); 
Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information 
Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 314 (2011) (sounding an 
alarm about the escalating cybersecurity threats facing management of every enterprise addresses 
a director’s “role in the risk oversight of the corporations they serve, their role in governance of 
IT, a director’s role in mitigating IT risks, and ways in which that risk can be transferred to or 
shared with others”), http://bit.do/BoardResponsibilityforITGovernance; Jonathan Zittrain, The 
Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1974-80 (2006), (a pioneering work discussing 
software vulnerabilities). 
 2. Corporate Governance and Cyber Risks: Sharpening the Focus, Address Hearing 
Before the New York Stock Exchange, Conference on “Cyber Risks and the Boardroom,” (2014) 
(Statement of Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Boards of 
Directors) (“For example, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), James 
Comey, said last November that ‘resources devoted to cyber-based threats will equal or even 
eclipse the resources devoted to non-cyber based terrorist threats.’”), 
http://bit.do/CorpGovernanceCyberRisks; Protecting Your Personal Data: How Law 
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enforcement and financial regulators have stated publicly that cyber-
attacks are becoming both more frequent and more sophisticated,”3 
Commissioner Aguilar warned that “cyber-attacks have become 
increasingly costly to companies that are attacked. According to one 
2013 survey, the average annualized cost of cybercrime to a sample of 
U.S. companies was $11.6 million per year, representing a 78% 
increase since 2009.”4 Particularly alarming are survey research results 
of senior decision-makers among the largest companies in 59 countries 
indicating that nearly fifty percent of respondents “see cybercrime as a 
																																								 																				
Enforcement Works With The Private Sector To Prevent Cybercrime: Hearing before the House 
Comm. on Homeland Sec’y, Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec’y Tech., 
113th Cong. (2014) (written testimony of Ari Baranoff, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, United 
States Secret Service Criminal Investigative Division) (“Advances in computer technology and 
greater access to personally identifiable information (PII) via the Internet have created online 
marketplaces for transnational cyber criminals to share stolen information and criminal 
methodologies. As a result, the Secret Service has observed a marked increase in the quality, 
quantity, and complexity of cybercrimes targeting private industry and critical infrastructure.”), 
http://bit.do/ProtectingPersonalData; Threats to the Homeland: Hearing before the Senate Comm. 
on Homeland Sec’y and Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of James B. Comey, Jr., 
Director, FBI, U.S. Department of Justice), http://bit.do/ThreatsToHomeland; see also House 
Comm. on Homeland Sec’y, 114 Cong. (2014) (statement of Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security) (“DHS must continue efforts to address the growing cyber 
threat to the private sector and the ‘.gov’ networks, illustrated by the real, pervasive, and ongoing 
series of attacks on public and private infrastructure.”), http://bit.do/JehJohnsonStatement; 
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta to the Business Executives for National 
Security (Oct. 11, 2012) (“As director of the CIA and now Secretary of Defense, I have understood 
that cyber attacks are every bit as real as the more well-known threats like terrorism, nuclear 
weapons proliferation and the turmoil that we see in the Middle East. And the cyber threats facing 
this country are growing.”), http://bit.do/RemarksByLeonPanetta. 
 3. Corporate Governance and Cyber Risks, supra note 2; for example, on December 9, 
2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council held a meeting to discuss cybersecurity threats to 
the financial system. See U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Financial Stability 
Oversight Council to Meet December 9 (2013), http://bit.do/FinancialStabilityOversight. During 
that meeting, Assistant Treasury Secretary Cyrus-Amir-Mokri said that “[o]ur experience over 
the last couple of years shows that cyber-threats to financial institutions and markets are growing 
in both frequency and sophistication.” See Remarks of Assistant Secretary Cyrus Amir-Mokri on 
Cybersecurity at a Meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Dec. 9, 
2013), http://bit.do/CyrusAmir-MokriRemarks. In addition, in testimony before the House 
Financial Services Committee in 2011, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Cyber Division stated 
that the number and sophistication of malicious incidents involving financial institutions has 
increased dramatically over the past several years and offered numerous examples of such attacks, 
which included fraudulent monetary transfers, unauthorized financial transactions from 
compromised bank and brokerage accounts, denial of service attacks on U.S. stock exchanges, 
and hacking incidents in which confidential information was misappropriated. See U.S. House, 
House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit, 112 Cong. (statement of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, FBI, U.S. 
Department of Justice) (2011), http://bit.do/GordonSnowStatement. 
 4. HP Press Release, HP Reveals Cost of Cybercrime Escalates 70 Percent, Time to 
Resolve Attacks More Than Doubles (Oct. 8, 2013), http://bit.do/HPRevealsCostOfCybercrime. 
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very or fairly low risk to their business.”5 In addition, seventy-four 
percent of these mostly non-U.S. respondents “whose business had 
been breached stated that the breach had not been publicly disclosed.”6 
One estimate is that “cybercrime costs the United States approximately 
$100 billion annually.”7 
Top management and corporate directors are busy people. 
Competing demands for the time and attention of corporate directors 
include: all the preparation work required by committee assignments 
(such as audit, compensation, nominating and governance); key top 
management succession planning; the need to absorb complex 
information from a company’s financial statements; a reading load that 
includes important internal documents; compliance issues; strategy 
efforts; mandatory regulatory exposure areas (such as Dodd-Frank, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); necessary visits 
to company facilities; awareness and discussion of major financing 
issues; and ongoing ad hoc crisis management.8 In addition, some 
directors serve as CEO of another organization and may serve as a 
director of more than one board.9 Given this environment, developing 
a sophisticated awareness of cybersecurity issues is a challenge for 
those having significant competing responsibilities. 
My goal in this article is to explore the unusually complex subject 
of cybersecurity in a highly readable manner. First, I provide an 
examination of recent threats. Next, I discuss governmental policy 
initiatives. Third, I offer some basic tools that can be used by boards 
and top management to improve the quality of discussions with their 
information technology executives. At this point, it is likely that most 
top management and corporate directors have never heard of, let alone 
read: the SANS Critical Security Controls; OWASP Top Ten; 
																																								 																				
 5. EY, Overcoming Compliance Fatigue: Reinforcing the Commitment to Ethical 
Growth, 13th Global Fraud Survey, at 4 (2014) (based on 2,719 interviews of senior decision 
makers in 59 countries and territories between November 2013 and February 2014), 
http://bit.do/OvercomingComplianceFatigue. 
 6. Id.  See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and 
Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, (Dec. 10, 2016); Lawrence J. 
Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the 
Internet of Things (IoT) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
 7. Mitchell S. Kominsky, The Current Landscape of Cybersecurity Policy: Legislative 
Issues in the 113th Congress, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://bit.do/LandscapeOfCybersecurityPolicy. 
 8. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for 
Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012) [hereinafter Matrix]; 
Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. __ (2016). 
 9. Id. 
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CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors; Presidential 
Executive Order 13636 (& Treasury Dept. Report); Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review; or the NIST Framework. Hopefully, these 
suggestions about what top managers and boards can do to improve 
cyber awareness and readiness will result in meaningful progress 
toward strengthening cybersecurity governance.  
It is understandable that directors in many boardrooms wonder 
“How can I be expected to govern something I know so little about?”10 
The complex modern environment in which data resides serves to 
complicate the issues surrounding governance of cyber risk. Serving as 
the SEC’s inaugural Director of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and 
Financial Innovation (2009-2011), Professor Henry T.C. Hu, 
concluded that “modern financial innovation has resulted in objective 
realities that are far more complex than in the past, often beyond the 
capacity of the English language, accounting terminology, visual 
display, risk measurement, and other tools on which all depictions must 
primarily rely.”11 Professor Hu further observed that “such 
characteristics can be so complex that even ‘objective reality’ is subject 
to multiple meanings.”12 Significant additional costs may result from 
litigation stemming from potential liability exposure.13 Professor 
Frederick Chang observes: 
Cyber infrastructure is tightly woven into the very fabric of our lives and it 
would be very hard to imagine going back to an earlier time  ̶ but we are 
paying a heavy price for our technological dependence, and the problem is 
worsening with the passage of time. Our trust in cyberspace has been taken 
from us by hackers, cybercriminals and sophisticated cyber attackers who 
intend to do us harm . . . We expect that it should not be impossibly difficult 
to protect ourselves in cyberspace if/when the need arises. These 
expectations are simply not being met today. Attacks on both the public 
																																								 																				
 10. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 313 (citing Peter Weill and Jeanne 
W. Ross (depicting Information Technology as one of the “six key assets for any enterprise” (the 
others being human, physical, financial, intellectual property and relationships)). See PETER 
WEILL & JEANNE W. ROSS, IT GOVERNANCE: HOW TOP PERFORMERS MANAGE IT DECISIONS 
RIGHTS FOR SUPERIOR RESULTS 6 (2004) (Peter Weill, Director of the Center for Information 
Systems Research (“CISR”) and Senior Research Scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Sloan School of Management led research during 2001-2003, which studied 256 
enterprises in Europe, Asia Pacific and the Americas. During the same general time period, 
parallel studies were conducted by Jeanne Ross and Cynthia Beath at the University of Texas). 
 11. Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2012) (describing the environment of risk 
inherent in complex financial instruments associated with and subsequent to the 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally Kevin M. Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. McCullough, The Effect of Data 
Breaches on Shareholder Wealth, 13 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 61 (2010).  
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sector and the private sector are rampant. Denial of service, identity theft, 
and cyber extortion are now all too common . . . financial systems, national 
critical infrastructure systems, defense systems, and much more are all 
targets of sophisticated cyber attacks.14  
I.  THREATS ESCALATE 
Mike McConnell, Booz Allen Hamilton Vice Chairman and 
former U.S. Director of National Intelligence observed that “there isn’t 
a corporation in the nation today that can’t be penetrated, not one.”15 In 
his Congressional testimony, Professor Chang stated: “Today our 
opponents in cyberspace are intelligent, seam-seeking, shape-shifting 
adversaries, that have an uncanny ability to penetrate and evade cyber 
defenses and compromise the targeted system.”16 
According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, as of January, 
2016, more than 736 million records (from 3,930 data breaches) were 
reported as breached and exposed during 2015.17 During 2010, “one 
company reported a breach of 38 terabytes of information—equivalent 
to nearly double the amount of text contained in the Library of 
Congress.”18 Even more troubling “is the fact that the Clearinghouse 
records are not exhaustive, nor do they reflect breaches occurring 
outside the United States.”19 
 
	  
																																								 																				
 14. Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions: Hearings Before the H. Committee on Science, 
Space & Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and the Subcommittee on Research, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (statement of Frederick R. Chang, President & COO, 21CT, Inc. and former director 
of research at the U.S. National Security Agency), http://bit.do/CyberRDChallenges. 
 15. Ben Worthen, Watching and Waiting: Most Cyberattacks are Random. But some 
attackers know exactly whom they want, and how to strike, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://bit.do/CyberattacksAreRandom. 
 16. Is Your Data on the Healthcare.gov Website Secure?: Hearings Before the H. 
Committee on Science, Space & Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and the Subcommittee 
on Research, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Frederick R. Chang, Bobby B. Lyle Centennial 
Distinguished Chair in Cyber Security, Southern Methodist University), 
http://bit.do/HealthcareWebsiteSecure. See also John G. Palfrey, The Public and the Private at 
the United States Border with Cyberspace, 78 MISS. L.J. 241 (2008).  
 17. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015 Data Breach QuickView, RISKBASED SECURITY, 
http://bit.do/2015DataBreach. 
 18. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, We Need to Act on Cybersecurity, NAT’L L.J. (May 10, 
2010), http://bit.do/ActOnCybersecurity. 
 19. Id.  
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Exhibit One:  
Reported Incidents of Loss, Theft or Exposure of Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) 
 
 
Exhibit One, courtesy of Risk Based Security, Inc., presents a 
disturbing picture of the rapid increase in data theft over the past five 
years.20  
A. Top Ten Major Breaches 
Here, courtesy of Risk Based Security, Inc., is a list of the top ten 
disclosed major breaches to date based on the number of records 
exposed:21 
1. UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION. Reported breach 
of 220 million records on August 22, 2014.22 
2. UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION. Reported breach 
of 191 million exposed records in United States of 
voter names, addresses, dates of birth, phone 
numbers, genders, political party affiliations, and 
																																								 																				
 20. Data Loss Statistics: Number of Incidents, RISK BASED SEC., INC. (2015), 
http://bit.do/DataLossStatistics. 
 21. Id. at 11-13. 
 22. Id. 
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other personal information (12/28/2015).23 
3. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION. 
Breach exposing 173 million records, including 
customer trip details (6/21/2014).24 
4. ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. Encounters a hack 
exposing 152 million records, including customer 
names, debit and credit card information with 
expiration dates, IDs on October 3, 2013.25   
5. SHANGHAI ROADWAY D&B MARKETING 
SERVICES CO. LTD. Replaced the Heartland 
Payments breach as the largest ever reported incident 
at the time involving 150 million records in March 
2012).26 
6. eBAY, INC. Reports 145 million records 
compromised on May 21, 2014.27 
7. UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION. A breach 
involving 140 million records is reported on June 8, 
2013.28 
8. HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, TOWER 
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, BEVERLY 
NATIONAL BANK, NORTH MIDDLESEX 
SAVINGS BANK, GOLDEN CHICK. Heartland 
involved a theft by cybercriminals using malicious 
software of 130 million credit and debit card 
numbers, resulting in a securities fraud class action 
for “fraudulently misrepresent[ing] the general state 
of its data security” and concealing an earlier 
cyberattack during earnings calls and in SEC 
filings.29 Heartland knew that the stolen data included 
names, credit and debit card numbers, and expiration 
dates.30  
																																								 																				
23.     Id. 
24.     Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.; Shanghai Roadway D&B Marketing Services Co. Ltd., OPEN SOURCE 
FOUNDATION/DATALOSSDB.ORG. (Mar. 3, 2012), http://bit.do/ShanghaiRoadway.  
 27. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20; eBay Inc. Filing with U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission on Form 8-k (May 21, 2014), http://bit.do/eBayFilingSEC.  
 28. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20. 
 29. Id.; In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 09-01043-AET-TJB, at 5 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 7, 2009); see also Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 333 (citing Brian Krebs, 
Payment Processor Breach May be Largest Ever, WASH. POST SECURITY FIX BLOG, 
http://bit.do/PaymentProcessorBreach (Jan. 20, 2009)). 
 30. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20; Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 333; 
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9. TARGET BRANDS INC., FAZIO 
MECHANICAL SERVICES, INC. Breach of 110 
million records reported on December 18, 2013.31 
10. HOME DEPOT. Breach of 109 million records with 
details of payment cards and customer email 
addresses (9/2/2014).32 
II.  HERE COME THE HACKERS 
Contemporary examples of cyberattack include the widely 
discussed breaches at Target,33 J.P. Morgan Chase,34 the U.S. Postal 
Service,35 Home Depot,36 and the November 2014 breach of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment.37 In many of these more recent cases, the facts 
																																								 																				
Press Release, Visa, Heartland Payments Systems Agrees on Settlement to Provide Visa Issuers 
up to $60M for Data Breach Security Claims (Jan. 8, 2010), http://bit.do/ 
PaymentProcessorBreach; Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland Payment 
Systems® and Mastercard Agree to $41.4 Million Intrusion Settlement: Company has now 
reached breach-related settlements with three major card brands (May 19, 2010), 
http://bit.do/HeartlandSettlement3CardBrands; Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, 
Heartland Payment Systems and American Express Agree to $3.6 Million Intrusion Settlement: 
Settlement marks first agreement with a card brand related to 2008 intrusion (Dec. 17, 2009),  
http://bit.do/HeartlandAmExSettlement; Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland 
Payment Systems Agrees to Settle Cardholder Class Action Claim (Dec. 21, 2009), 
PYMNTS.COM, http://bit.do/HeartlandSettleClassAction. 
 31. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The Next Pearl Harbor?,18 N.C. 
J. OF L. & TECH. 232 (2016). 
 34. Emily Glazer, Danny Yadron & Daniel Huang, Hackers May Have Targeted at Least 
13 Firms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://bit.do/HackersTargetedFirms; Sarah Bloom Raskin, 
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Remarks Before the Meeting of the Texas 
Bankers’ Association Executive Leadership Cybersecurity Conference: Cybersecurity for Banks: 
10 Questions for Executives and Their Boards (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://bit.do/CybersecurityForBanks. 
 35. Laura Stevens & Danny Yadron & Devlin Barrett, U.S. Post Office Says it Was Victim 
of a Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://bit.do/USPostOfficeVictimBreach. 
 36. See Shelly Banjo, Home Depot Hackers Exposed 53 Million Email Addresses, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://bit.do/HomeDepotHack; Michael Calia, Breach Plagues Home Depot, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://bit.do/BreachPlaguesHomeDepot (reporting estimated cost of 
hacking to be $34 million during 2014). 
 37. See Center for Strategic & International Studies, Significant Cyber Incidents Since 
2006, (reporting that ‘Sony Pictures Entertainment is hacked, with the malware deleting data and 
the hackers posting online employees’ personal information and unreleased films. The incident is 
similar to earlier hacks against South Korean media outlets), 
http://bit.do/CyberIncidentsSince2006; see also Adrienne Debigare, Rebekah Heacock Jones & 
Jiou Park, 2014 Year In Review, In Urs Gasser, Jonathan Zittrain, Robert Faris & Rebekah 
Heacock Jones, Internet Monitor 2014: Reflections on the Digital World: Platforms, Policy, 
Privacy, and Public Discourse, at 12, 22 (Dec. 15, 2014), http://bit.do/ReflectionsOn 
DigitalWorld; Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2014-17 (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://bit.do/Berkman ResearchPublication2014-17. 
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are still being determined and litigation being brought. However, 
valuable lessons can be learned from several of the more seasoned 
breach cases of recent years, including Nortel and Heartland. 
A. Nortel Hacked 
Of particular importance to corporate boards and executives 
seeking to acquire other businesses is the example of Nortel, a case 
study that offers fair warning to all of the Trojan horse potential for 
highly destructive malware and spyware through acquisitions of data 
assets. Nortel Networks, a Canadian company traded publicly in the 
U.S., “was a pioneering maker of the computer switches and telecom 
gear that powers much of the world’s phone and internet networks.”38 
Dating back to at least the year 2000, it appears Chinese-based hackers 
successfully gained access, by using seven stolen passwords, including 
a former CEO’s, to penetrate and leisurely download materially 
everything they wanted from Nortel Networks.39 This breach included 
the download of “technical papers, research-and-development reports, 
business plans, employee emails and other documents according to 
Brian Shields, a former 10-year Nortel veteran who led an internal 
investigation.”40 The Wall Street Journal observes that “Nortel’s 
breach offers a rare level of detail about a type of international 
corporate espionage that is of a growing concern to U.S. officials. A 
U.S. intelligence report released in November [2011] concluded that 
hackers operating from China . . . are the world’s most ‘active and 
persistent’ perpetrators of industrial spying.”41 
Nortel has sold its component parts pursuant to their 2009 
bankruptcy. However, according to several former employees, “the 
company didn’t fix the hacking problem before starting to sell its 
assets, and didn’t disclose the hacking to prospective buyers.”42 Sean 
McGurk, credited with previously running the U.S. government’s 
cybersecurity intelligence center, stated, “When you are buying those 
files or that intellectual property, you’re also buying that ‘rootkit,’ . . . 
a term that refers to embedded spy software.”43  
The spyware unearthed in 2009 was a sophisticated mix . . . . [R]esearchers 
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found a particularly malicious and hard-to-spot spying tool, namely 
‘rootkit’ software that can give a hacker full control over a computer and 
enables them to conceal their spying campaign . . . . 
On one computer, hackers had set up an encrypted communications channel 
to an Internet address near Beijing. On the other computer, the investigators 
found a program that hackers were likely using to sniff out other security 
weaknesses within Nortel’s networks. The hackers had created a ‘reliable 
back door,” according to one person familiar with the investigation, 
allowing them to come and go as they pleased in Nortel’s network.44 
B. The Heartland Breach: What Happened 
In another useful breach example, Heartland Payment Systems, a 
major credit card processor, disclosed on January 20, 2009 that 
cybercriminals had stolen 130 million credit card and debit card 
numbers, “at the time believed to be the largest security breach ever.”45 
As a result, “the company and its officers and directors were forced to 
pay $60 million in a settlement with Visa,46 $41.4 million in a 
settlement with MasterCard,47 $3.6 million in a settlement with 
American Express,48 up to $2.4 million in a consumer cardholder class 
action49 over the same breach, as well as the defense costs of the 
dismissed suit.”50 
On August 13, 2009 the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Payment Card Center hosted a workshop to “discuss lessons learned as 
a result of [the Heartland] event [and to examine] the changing nature 
of data security in consumer electronic payments.”51 Learning exactly 
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what happened at Heartland and other breaches is helpful in any 
attempt to stave off future threats. In Heartland, their network 
compromise “was ultimately determined to be SQL injection”:52  
Code written eight years ago for a web form allowed access to Heartland’s 
corporate network. This code had a vulnerability that (1) was not identified 
through annual internal and external audits of Heartland’s systems or 
through continuous internal system-monitoring procedures, and (2) 
provided a means to extend the compromise from the corporate network to 
the separate payment processing network. Although the vulnerability 
existed for several years, SQL injection didn’t occur until late 2007. 
After compromising Heartland’s corporate network, the intruders spent 
almost six months and many hours hiding their activities while attempting 
to access the processing network, bypassing different anti-virus packages 
used by Heartland. After accessing the corporate network, the fraudsters 
installed sniffer software that was able to capture payment card data, 
including card numbers, card expiration dates, and, in some cases, 
cardholder names as the data moved within Heartland’s processing 
system.53 
The fraudsters’ focus on compromising data as they moved within 
Heartland’s network – data in transit – rather than when they were stored in 
consumer databases – or, in other words, when data were at rest – was a 
relatively new phenomenon . . . . One example, if not the first, of this 
expansion in focus toward data-in-transit compromises was the data breach 
at Hannaford Brothers announced in early 2008.54 
Heartland Chairman and CEO Robert Carr outlines Heartland’s 
response to the breach as “rest[ing] on two pillars aimed at the 
merchant acquiring and processing side of the payment system: 
improve data sharing and better secure data, particularly data in 
transit.”55 The Heartland breach was particularly unexpected since the 
company “was certified by network-approved quality security 
assessors (QSAs) as being PCI compliant at the time of the breach and, 
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in fact, had received this certification several times during the period 
in which the vulnerability had been present.56 In addition,  
[Mr. Carr] used this point not to diminish PCI but rather to emphasize that 
PCI compliance is a minimum standard and that most companies regularly 
do much more than required by PCI. Heartland Payment Systems was one 
of those companies that had met its PCI requirements and had made data 
security one of its top, if not its top, business priorities. Carr said that 
Heartland manages data security 24/7 and has about 7 percent of its 
information technology staff focused on security efforts, including a 
recently hired senior executive who focuses solely on data security and 
strategy. That data breach occurred despite Heartland’s strong focus on data 
security and its status as being PCI compliant has led Carr to the opinion 
that more must be done to increase the security of data transfers (data in 
transit) among participants in the payments system, including merchants.57 
C. Heartland’s Lessons Learned 
Heartland Chairman and CEO Robert Carr offered the following 
additional comments about the Heartland data breach incident: 
1. Do not underestimate the insider threat, 
2. Ensure the appropriate audit scope, and 
3. Maintain in-house security expertise at the senior executive 
level.58 
Mr. Carr also emphasized that  
insider threats may not stem from intentional fraud but rather from 
misplaced employee goodwill. For example, an employee may retain 
cached files, including account information, on their computer in order to 
more quickly process customer service requests. In addition, security 
protocols must be universally applied and enforced among all employees, 
at all levels of hierarchy and across all departments. Ensuring that auditors 
have a wide scope to review systems for security vulnerabilities is also 
important to identify situations, such as happened at Heartland, in which 
fraudsters were able to penetrate the processing system by first 
compromising another, separate network, in this case the corporate 
network. Finally, security expertise and strategic planning are critical skills 
that should be emphasized at the highest levels of the corporate structure.59 
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D. FBI Action Against Cybercrime and Credit Card Theft 
During mid-2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
announced “the largest coordinated international law enforcement 
action in history directed at ‘carding’ crimes—offenses in which the 
Internet is used to traffic in and exploit the stolen credit card, bank 
account, and other personal identification information of hundreds of 
thousands of victims globally.”60 As the result of a two-year 
investigation, the coordinated cybercrime sting, which involved 
thirteen countries, including the United States,  
resulted in 24 arrests, including the domestic arrests of 11 individuals . . . 
in the United States, and the arrests of 13 individuals abroad by foreign law 
enforcement in seven countries . . . [and] prevented estimated potential 
economic losses of more than $205 million, notified credit card providers 
of over 411,000 compromised credit and debit cards, and notified 47 
companies, government entities, and educational institutions of the breach 
of their networks.61 
Those eleven arrests took place “in the United Kingdom (six 
arrests), Bosnia (two), Bulgaria (one), Norway (one), and Germany 
(one). Two additional defendants were arrested in foreign countries 
based on provisional arrest warrants obtained by the United States in 
connection with complaints unsealed today in the Southern District of 
New York.”62 The FBI allegations “chronicle a breathtaking spectrum 
of cyber schemes and scams… individuals sold credit cards by the 
thousands and took the private information of untold numbers of 
people. As alleged, the defendants casually offered every stripe of 
malware and virus to fellow fraudsters.”63  
According to the FBI press release, “In June 2010, the FBI 
established an undercover carding forum called ‘Carder Profit’ (the 
‘UC Site’), enabling users to discuss various topics related to carding 
and to communicate offers to buy, sell, and exchange goods and 
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services related to carding, among other things.”64 The UC Site was 
established by the FBI 
in an effort to identify these cybercriminals, investigate their crimes, and 
prevent harm to innocent victims. The UC Site was configured to allow the 
FBI to monitor and to record the discussion threads posted to the site, as 
well as private messages sent through the site between registered users. The 
UC Site also allowed the FBI to record the Internet protocol (IP) addresses 
of users’ computers when they accessed the site. The IP address is the 
unique number that identifies a computer on the Internet and allows 
information to be routed properly between computers. 
Access to the UC Site, which was taken offline in May 2012, was limited 
to registered members and required a username and password to gain entry. 
Various membership requirements were imposed from time to time to 
restrict site membership to individuals with established knowledge of 
carding techniques or interest in criminal activity. For example, at times, 
new users were prevented from joining the site unless they were 
recommended by two existing users who had registered with the site or 
unless they paid a registration fee. 
New users registering with the UC Site were required to provide a valid e-
mail address as part of the registration process. The e-mail addresses 
entered by registered members of the site were collected by the FBI.65 
According to the FBI, the term “carding” involves “various 
criminal activities associated with stealing personal identification 
information and financial information belonging to other individuals—
including the account information associated with credit cards, bank 
cards, debit cards, or other access devices—and using that information 
to obtain money, goods, or services without the victims’ authorization 
or consent.”66 To illustrate,  
a criminal might gain unauthorized access to (or “hack”) a database 
maintained on a computer server and steal credit card numbers and other 
personal information stored in that database. The criminal can then use the 
stolen information to . . . buy goods or services online; manufacture 
counterfeit credit cards by encoding them with the stolen account 
information; manufacture false identification documents (which can be 
used in turn to facilitate fraudulent purchases); or sell the stolen information 
to others who intend to use it for criminal purposes. Carding . . . 
encompasses a variety of federal offenses, including, but not limited to, 
identification document fraud, aggravated identity theft, access device 
fraud, computer hacking, and wire fraud.67 
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The term “carding forums” refers to websites used by carders  
to exchange information related to carding, such as information concerning 
hacking methods or computer-security vulnerabilities that could be used to 
obtain personal identification information; and to buy and sell goods and 
services related to carding—for example, stolen credit or debit card account 
numbers, hardware for creating counterfeit credit or debit cards, or goods 
bought with compromised credit card or debit card accounts. Carding 
forums often permit users to post public messages—postings that can be 
viewed by all users of the site—sometimes referred to as threads. For 
example, a user who has stolen credit card numbers may post a public thread 
offering to sell the numbers.68  
The FBI provides the following explanation of how many of these 
illegal criminal activities are conducted: 
Individuals who use stolen credit card information to purchase goods on the 
Internet are typically reluctant to ship the goods to their own home 
addresses, for fear that law enforcement could easily trace the purchases. 
Accordingly, carders often seek out “drop addresses”—addresses with 
which they have no association, such as vacant houses or apartments—
where carded goods can be shipped and retrieved without leaving evidence 
of their involvement in the shipment. Some individuals used carding forums 
to sell “drop services” to other forum members, usually in exchange for 
some form of compensation. One frequently used form of compensation is 
a “1-to-1” arrangement in which the carder wishing to ship to the drop must 
ship two of whatever items he has carded—one for the provider of the drop 
to forward to the carder and the other for the provider of the drop to keep 
as payment in kind for the carder’s use of the drop. Another frequently used 
compensation arrangement is for the carder and the drop provider to agree 
to resell the carded items shipped to the drop and to split the proceeds 
between them.69 
III.  BARBARIANS AT THE GATES 
A. Post-9/11 Transnational Legal Framework 
The increased reliance on cyber warfare and advances in computer 
technology as a front line of offensive and defensive national security 
weapons means that “cybersecurity is the newest and most unique 
national security issue of the twenty-first century.”70 This de facto new 
transnational legal environment has evolved following the 9/11 
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City and is 
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“turbocharged by [the] unexpected recent challenges, which include 
terrorism, financial chaos, and environmental and national security.”71 
Stuart S. Malawer observes that “the emergent rules are drawn from 
disparate legal systems. This newer body of legal rules is termed 
‘global law,’ which can be defined as legal rules drawn from different 
systems that address a range of cross-border topics.”72 Moreover, 
[t]he rules originate from public international law (such as the law of war), 
specialized international legal systems (such as rules governing the 
international environment, global trade, and international finance), regional 
legal systems (governing such areas as human rights), and major national 
legal systems as they confront transnational problems (such as torture, 
counterterrorism, and cybersecurity). These rules sometimes establish 
binding obligations, and other times, something less. 
To competently practice law and undertake policy analysis in today’s world 
of failing states, transnational terrorism, global pollution, and growing 
multilateral institutions, practitioners and policy makers must understand 
the legal contours of this dramatically changing environment.73 
B. Assault on Federal, State and Local Governments 
It appears that government agencies are the prime targets of 
certain groups intent on creating highly-visible cyber disruption 
problems. On June 15, 2011, “Lulz Security, a group of hackers who 
have been responsible for a number of recent online data breaches, took 
aim at some United States government agencies . . . . The group said 
via Twitter that it had brought down the Central Intelligence Agency 
website, presumably with a so-called denial of service attack.”74 
Although “a denial of service attack involves using many computers to 
bombard a Web site with an overload of traffic, knocking it offline--- 
these types of attacks do not result in data being stolen or servers being 
breached.”75 During the same week Lulz Security claimed 
responsibility for several other victims, including an F.B.I. Web site 
and an internal file from the U.S. Senate Web site.”76 The same group 
previously claimed responsibility for the PBS and Sony Pictures 
breaches.77 
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Pinguelo and Muller reported that “the weak American economy 
[post-2008] has caused most states to severely trim their budgets, 
reducing their ability to devote expenditures to cyberdefense.”78 As a 
result, most states “remain an appealing target for cybercriminals, as 
their networks hold some of their citizens’ most vital information, 
including health and driving records, educational and criminal records, 
professional licenses, and tax information.79 In particular, 
State universities are an especially vulnerable target, as shown in May 2009 
when officials at the University of California-Berkeley announced that 
hackers had stolen the Social Security numbers of approximately 97,000 
students, alumni, and others over the course of six months. Meanwhile, in 
September 2010, cybercriminals stole nearly $1 million from the University 
of Virginia’s College at Wise. The cyber thieves compromised a computer 
belonging to the university’s comptroller, and used a computer virus to gain 
access to the University’s bank account. Luckily, the school was able to 
recover the money.80 
While potentially applicable at the state government level, the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO), in its 2009 report for the 
federal government, outlined the following six major sources of cyber 
threats: “foreign nations, criminal groups, hackers, hacktivists 
[politically motivated attacks], disgruntled insiders and terrorists”:81 
In a post-9/11 world, the prospect of a rogue cyberterrorist is particularly 
frightening, especially when considering some of the methods that could be 
used to cripple the nation: [A] cyberterrorist might hack into computer 
systems and disrupt domestic banking, the stock exchanges and 
international financial transactions, leading to a loss of confidence in the 
economy. Or he might break into an air traffic control system and 
manipulate it, causing planes to crash or collide. A terrorist could hack into 
a pharmaceutical company’s computers, changing the formula of some 
essential medication and causing thousands to die. Or a terrorist could break 
into a utility company’s computers, changing pressure in gas lines, 
tinkering with valves and causing a suburb to detonate and burn.82 
C. Cyberattack: A National Security Issue 
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“The next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a 
cyberattack that cripples’ America’s electrical grid and its security and 
financial systems,” observed Central Intelligence Agency Director 
Leon Panetta in his June 9, 2011 confirmation hearing for the post of 
secretary of defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee.83 A 
Wall Street Journal article titled Cyber Combat: Act of War, observes 
“The Pentagon’s first formal cyber strategy . . . represents an early 
attempt to grapple with a changing world in which a hacker could pose 
as significant a threat to U.S. nuclear reactors, subways or pipelines as 
a hostile country’s military.”84 A question every enterprise should ask 
is whether its top management and board have a contingency plan in 
place in the event that the U.S. power grid is compromised and 
electricity becomes unavailable for a prolonged period of time. The 
Wall Street Journal article described the current landscape: 
Recent attacks on the Pentagon’s own systems--- as well as the sabotaging 
of Iran’s nuclear program via the Stuxnet computer worm—have given new 
urgency to U.S. efforts to develop a more formalized approach to cyber 
attacks. A key moment occurred in 2008, when at least one U.S. military 
computer system was penetrated… Lockheed Martin, a major military 
contractor, acknowledged that it had been the victim of an infiltration, while 
playing down its impact . . . . 
One idea gaining momentum at the Pentagon is the notion of ‘equivalence.’ 
If a cyber attack produces the death, damage, destruction or high-level 
disruption that a traditional military attack would cause, then it would be a 
candidate for a “use of force” consideration, which could merit retaliation.85 
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn says that “If we can 
minimize the impact of attacks on our operations and attribute them 
quickly and definitively, we may be able to change the decision 
calculus of an attacker.”86 The problem is massive, as “[e]ach year, a 
volume of intellectual property exceeding the size of the Library of 
Congress is stolen from U.S. Government and private-sector 
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networks.”87 U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta “noted a July [2012] 
attack against Saudi Arabia’s state oil company, Aramco, in which a 
virus erased critical files on some 30,000 computers, replacing them 
with images of burning American flags.”88 During March 2014, the 
New York Times reports that “Chinese hackers broke into computers 
that stored the personal information of all United States government 
employees.”89 During May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice 
charged five Chinese hackers, identified as “officers of Unit 61398 of 
the Third Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” 
with cyber espionage directed at six American companies, including: 
Alcoa; Allegheny Technologies Inc.; U.S. Steel; Westinghouse 
Electric Co.; U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG; and others.90 
According to the DOJ, 
The indictment alleges that the defendants conspired to hack into American 
entities, to maintain unauthorized access to their computers and to steal 
information from those entities that would be useful to their competitors in 
China, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In some cases, it alleges, 
the conspirators stole trade secrets that would have been particularly 
beneficial to Chinese companies at the time they were stolen. In other cases, 
it alleges, the conspirators also stole sensitive, internal communications that 
would provide a competitor, or an adversary in litigation, with insight into 
the strategy and vulnerabilities of the American entity. 
“This is a case alleging economic espionage by members of the Chinese 
military and represents the first ever charges against a state actor for this 
type of hacking,” U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said. “The range of 
trade secrets and other sensitive business information stolen in this case is 
significant and demands an aggressive response. Success in the global 
market place should be based solely on a company’s ability to innovate and 
compete, not on a sponsor government’s ability to spy and steal business 
secrets. This Administration will not tolerate actions by any nation that 
seeks to illegally sabotage American companies and undermine the integrity 
of fair competition in the operation of the free market.” 
“For too long, the Chinese government has blatantly sought to use cyber 
espionage to obtain economic advantage for its state-owned industries,” 
																																								 																				
 87. Id. 
 88. Julian E. Barnes & Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Readies Defense Against Cyberthreats, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2012), http://bit.do/ReadiesDefense. 
 89. Matt Apuzzo, Chinese Businessman is Charged in Plot to Steal U.S. Military Data,  
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2014), http://bit.do/ChineseChargedStealUSMilitaryData.  
 90. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for 
Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial 
Advantage: First Time Criminal Charges Are Filed Against Known State Actors for Hacking 
(May 19, 2014), http://bit.do/USCharges5ChineseMilitaryHackers.  
2016] MANAGING CYBERTHREAT  251 
	
said FBI Director James B. Comey.91  
Mortimer Zuckerman, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of U.S. 
News & World Report adds, “Cyberterrorism poses a threat equal to 
that of weapons of mass destruction. A large scale attack could create 
an unimaginable degree of chaos in America.”92 Zuckerman continues 
We should think of cyberattacks as guided missiles and respond similarly—
intercept them and retaliate. This means we need a federal agency dedicated 
to defending our various networks. You cannot expect the private sector to 
know how—or to have the money—to defend against a nation-state attack 
in a cyberwar . . . . Few nations have used computer networks as extensively 
as we have to control electric power grids, airlines, railroads, banking and 
military support. Few nations have more of these essential systems owned 
and operated by private enterprise. As with 9/11, we do not enjoy the luxury 
of a dilatory response.93 
What if major transportation systems are disrupted, such as 
airlines traffic control systems? Cyberattacks may negatively impact 
your business operations, even if your enterprise is not the sole focus 
of attack. What would be the result to your operations if the U.S. 
payment systems are compromised by a successful cyberattack on 
financial institutions? The SEC issued a recent study, Observations on 
Developments in Risk Appetite Frameworks and IT Infrastructures, 
which was conducted by senior financial supervisors from ten countries 
and concluded 
[T]hat while firms have made progress in developing risk appetite 
frameworks and have begun multi-year projects to improve IT 
infrastructure, considerably more work must be done to strengthen these 
practices. In particular, the aggregation of risk data remains a challenge, 
despite its criticality to strategic planning, decision making, and risk 
management.94 
Richard Clarke, former White House national security advisor to 
three U.S. presidents, writes “If we discovered Chinese explosives laid 
throughout our national electrical system, we’d consider it an act of 
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war. Digital bombs pose as grave a threat.”95 Just a few days prior to 
Richard Clarke’s published article, Google reported that “Chinese 
hackers targeted the email accounts of senior U.S. officials and 
hundreds of prominent people in a fresh computer attack certain to 
intensify growing concern about the security of the Internet.”96 Clarke 
further observes that 
Ongoing cyber ‘hacktivism’ has . . . demonstrated three things that should 
cause nations to act. First, the ease with which the hacktivists have been 
able to steal data and to shut down Web pages suggests that companies (and 
perhaps governments) in the region [Middle East] have not yet taken cyber 
security seriously. Governments in other regions (Asia, Europe, North 
America) have been educating, assisting and regulating companies to 
improve their cyber security. There has been a notable lack of such 
government activity in the Middle East, and that inactivity has opened the 
way for citizen hackers to cause the mischief we see today. 
If the hackers turn their attention to disruption and destruction, as some have 
threatened, they are likely to find the controls for electric power grids, oil 
pipelines and precious water systems inadequately secured. If a hacker 
causes real physical damage to critical systems in that region, it could 
quickly involve governments retaliating against each other with both cyber 
and conventional weapons. Middle Eastern governments need to get their 
citizen hackers under control and better protect their own critical networks, 
or they will eventually be dragged into unwanted conflict. 
Second, the Arab-Israeli hacker exchanges have demonstrated again the 
lack of any effective international organization to assist in preventing cyber 
crime and de-escalating tensions among nations in cyberspace. The 
Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime, which entered into force in July 
2004 and has been ratified by more than 40 countries including the U.S., 
does require nations to assume responsibilities for any attacks that originate 
in their cyberspace.97 
Clarke proposes an “International Cyber Risk Reduction Center,” 
and notes that if “Saudi Arabia’s stock market is again knocked off-
line by a cyber attack originating in Israel (or vice versa), the Saudi’s 
should be able to call an international center and seek assistance.”98 
Furthermore, “Israel as a member of the international center should be 
able to act promptly to see the attack and shut it down. All of this should 
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happen in a few hours.”99 Scholars are exploring how computer warfare 
might “limit unnecessary suffering and reduce civilian casualties.”100  
D. Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future 
During November 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security published its Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: The 
Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise, which 
was “designed to protect the critical systems and assets that are vital to 
the United States, and, over time, to foster stronger, more resilient 
information and communication technologies to enable government, 
business and individuals to be safer online.”101 The Blueprint provides 
for two areas of action, “Protecting our Critical Information 
Infrastructure Today and Building a Stronger Cyber Ecosystem for 
Tomorrow.”102 In addition, four goals for protecting the critical 
information infrastructure are listed: “reduce exposure to cyberrisk; 
ensure priority response and recovery; maintain shared situational 
awareness; and increase resilience.”103 Homeland Security Secretary 
Janet Napolitano observed: 
Emerging cyber threats require the engagement of the entire society—from 
government and law enforcement to the private sector and most 
importantly, members of the public. Today in cyberspace, the Nation faces 
a myriad of threats from criminals, including individual hackers and 
organized criminal groups, as well as technologically advanced nation-
states. Individuals and well-organized groups exploit technical 
vulnerabilities to steal American intellectual property, personal 
information, and financial data. The increasing number and sophistication 
of these incidents has the potential to impact our economic competitiveness 
and threaten the public’s ability to access and obtain basic services. 
Government, non-governmental and private sector entities, as well as 
individuals, families, and communities must collaborate on ways to 
effectively reduce risk.104  
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E. Failure of Cybersecurity Act of 2012 
Despite consensus that cyberthreats represent a clear and present 
danger, Congress has not been particularly quick to act during the past 
decade. Senate Bill S.2105 (Cybersecurity Act of 2012), which failed 
to clear the Senate in August 2012, required private companies 
operating critical infrastructure to meet certain security 
requirements.105 This proposed legislation required companies 
operating “power plants, oil pipelines and other vital services to meet 
certain security standards.”106 Other requirements included 
establishing a “mechanism for industry to more easily share 
information on threats with the government.”107 Senator Joseph 
Lieberman stated:  
Every day rival nations, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates and individual 
hackers probe the weaknesses in our most critical computer networks, 
seeking to steal government and industrial secrets or to plant cyber agents 
in the cyber systems that control our most critical infrastructure and would 
enable an enemy to seize control of a city’s electric grid or water supply 
system with the touch of a key from a world away. The current ongoing and 
growing cyber threat not only threatens our security here at home, but it is 
right now having a very damaging impact on our economic prosperity. 
Extremely valuable intellectual property is being stolen regularly by cyber 
exploitation by people and individuals and groups and countries abroad. It 
is then being replicated without the initial cost done by American 
companies. This means jobs are being created abroad that would otherwise 
be created here. So when we talk about cybersecurity, people naturally 
focus on the very real danger that an enemy will attack us through 
cyberspace, but as we think about how to grow our economy and create jobs 
again, I’ve come to the conclusion this is one of the more important things 
we can do to protect the treasures of America’s intellectual innovation from 
being stolen by competitors abroad.108  
On August 8, 2012, John O. Brennan, at that time Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism gave his “U.S. 
Policy toward Yemen” speech before the Council on Foreign 
																																								 																				
 105. S.2105, 112th Cong. (2012). See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional 
Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who & How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016). 
 106. Siobhan Gorman, Senators Push a Bill on Security, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2012); 
http://bit.do/SenatorsPushSecurityBill; see generally Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber 
Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L. SEC. L. & POL’Y 153 (2010). 
 107. Gorman, supra note 106.  
 108. Securing America’s Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. 
On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2012) (Opening 
Statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman), http://bit.do/SecuringAmericasFuture; but see Susan 
W. Brenner, Cyber-Threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 
137 (2011). 
2016] MANAGING CYBERTHREAT  255 
	
Relations. Following his prepared remarks, Mr. Brennan, now Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, remarked that the consequences of 
the failed cybersecurity legislation is that “we’re not going to have 
enhanced authorities and capabilities of the U.S. government to deal 
with what is an increasingly serious cyber challenge to our nation and 
to our critical infrastructure in particular. We worked very hard to try 
to push forward and advance the cybersecurity provisions”109 Mr. 
Brennan continued, 
[T]he . . . American people are the ones that are going to be at risk, not just 
because of . . . personal identification information that is going to be out 
there, but also the water we drink . . . the electricity that we . . . depend 
upon, the hospitals that require that type of support, critical infrastructure—
that’s increasingly at risk . . . . 
[T]here are different types of cyberintrusions that we see. There are 
cyberintrusions to get to understand your environment. So they go in, and 
then it’s sort of operationally preparing the environments. [They] can go in 
just to map it so [they] understand it . . . to infiltrate certain type of data, or 
. . . [to] understand it and then…. take actions to disrupt, disable it and 
destroy [data] . . . . 
[W]hat we’re seeing now is a lot of intrusions. We’re seeing a lot of 
infiltrations . . . and then the next step is, again, the disruptive, disabling, 
destructive types of attacks. And so . . . electric grids, water treatment 
facilities . . . mass transportation systems . . . railways and trains, 
whatever—if those intruders get into those systems and then can determine 
how they can in fact interfere in the command and control systems of these 
systems, they . . . could . . . put trains onto the same tracks. They can . . . 
bring down electric grids . . . . 
[S]ome [foreign countries] . . . have tremendous . . . cyber capabilities . . . 
some of the most powerful countries in the world . . . . [D]o they want to 
bring down that critical infrastructure in the United States right now? No, 
because they rely on the U.S. economy, in fact for a number of reasons. 
There are some foreign actors out there, though, that if they had the 
opportunity to bring down elements of the U.S. economy, U.S. 
infrastructure, I think would do it . . . in a instant. So they fortunately don’t 
have the capability at this time. They may have the intent but not the 
capability. But you also have international criminal groups . . . [who] can 
do things to advance . . . criminal intent by bringing down certain types of 
. . . activities or infrastructure. So there could be all types of different 
reasons or different types of . . . groups or people that are doing this . . . . 
The president’s priority is to protect the safety and security of the American 
people. That’s the physical security of the American people as well as the 
prosperity of the American people . . . . And . . . we’ve been pushing. We’ve 
worked hard. We delivered our legislative package to the Hill . . . April, 
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May of last year, 2011. And unfortunately the Senate bill went down last 
week . . . it may be revived, but we can’t wait. So we’re doing things. DHS, 
in conjunction with . . . NSA, FBI, others, are working to make sure that 
we’re able to better safeguard our environment but also be able to respond 
and also to be resilient . . . . [O]ne of the approaches is if [cyber terrorists] 
take down some part of our critical infrastructure, you want to be able to . . 
. recover very quickly.110 
Reports of nation states mounting massive daily attacks against 
American computers are legion.111 During mid-2012, the New York 
Times reported that “In March [2012] the White House invited all the 
members of the Senate to a classified simulation on Capital Hill 
demonstrating what might happen if a dedicated hacker—or an enemy 
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state—decided to turn off the lights in New York City.112 As a result, 
the Pentagon “has proposed that military cyber-specialists be given 
permission to take action outside its computer networks to defend 
critical U.S. computer systems”:113  
Advances in technology and mounting concern about the potential for a 
cyber-attack to damage power stations, water-treatment plants and other 
critical systems have prompted senior officials to seek a more robust role 
for the department’s Cyber Command. 
The proposed rules would open the door for U.S. defense officials to act 
outside the confines of military-related computer networks to try to combat 
cyberattacks on private computers, including those in foreign countries. 
In establishing the new regulations, officials have sought to overcome 
concerns that action in another country’s networks could violate 
international law, upset allies or result in unintended consequences, such as 
the disruption of civilian networks.114 
F. Executive Order 13636 and Critical Infrastructure 
Following defeat of The Lieberman Cybersecurity Act during 
August 2012, The White House started circulating a draft cybersecurity 
Executive Order that “would establish a voluntary program where 
companies operating critical infrastructure would elect to meet 
cybersecurity best practices and standards crafted, in part, by the 
government.”115 On February 12, 2013, President Obama signed 
Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity,” which directs the Executive Branch to: 
1. Develop a technology-neutral voluntary cybersecurity framework;  
2. Promote and incentivize the adoption of cybersecurity practices;  
3. Increase the volume, timeliness and quality of cyber threat information 
sharing;  
4. Incorporate strong privacy and civil liberties protections into every 
initiative to secure our critical infrastructure; and  
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5. Explore the use of existing regulation to promote cybersecurity. 116  
In addition, Presidential Policy Directive-21: Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience replaces Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-7, and directs the Executive Branch to:  
1. Develop a situational awareness capability that addresses both physical 
and cyber aspects of how infrastructure is functioning in near-real time;  
2. Understand the cascading consequences of infrastructure failures;  
3. Evaluate and mature the public-private partnership;  
4. Update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan; and  
5. Develop comprehensive research and development plan.117  
What exactly constitutes “critical infrastructure”? The 2013 
Executive Order defines the term “critical infrastructure” as “systems 
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that 
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”118 By way 
of historical prespective, by the mid-1990s, “the growing threat of 
international terrorism led policy makers to reconsider the definition of 
“infrastructure” in the context of homeland security.”119 As early as 
1996, President Clinton recognized that: 
These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power 
systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, 
transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including 
medical, police, fire and rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to 
these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to 
tangible property (“physical threats”), and threats of electronic, radio-
frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or 
communications components that control critical infrastructures (“cyber 
threats”).120 
																																								 																				
 116. Fact Sheet on Executive Order (EO) 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21 Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 2013), http://bit.do/Improving 
CriticalInfrastructure. See generally Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11737 (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://bit.do/ImprovingCriticalInfrastructureCybersecurity. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Exec. Order No. 13636, supra note 116, at § 2. 
 119. JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32631, CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION (2004). 
 120. Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37345 (July 15, 1996). 
2016] MANAGING CYBERTHREAT  259 
	
In 2001, Executive Order 13228121 created the Office of Homeland 
Security and required the protection of:  
• Energy production, transmission, and distribution services and critical 
facilities 
• Other utilities 
• Telecommunications 
• Facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of nuclear material 
• Public and privately owned information systems  
• Special events of national significance 
• Transportation, including railways, highways, shipping ports and 
waterways 
• Airports and civilian aircraft 
• Livestock, agriculture, and systems for the provision of water and food 
for human use and consumption.122 
President Bush’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board was 
created by Executive Order 13231.123 A definition of “critical 
infrastructure was contained in The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 
107-56),124 and the Bush administration’s strategy for homeland 
security is articulated in The National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.125  
G. Treasury Report on Cybersecurity Incentives 
The 2013 Executive Order also directs “the Secretary of the 
Treasury, along with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to each make recommendations on a set of 
incentives that would promote private sector participation in the 
voluntary program.”126 This Treasury Report provides policymakers 
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with outlines to assess and “evaluate the benefits and relative 
effectiveness of government incentives in promoting the adoption of 
the eventual Framework. It seeks to identify types of situations in 
which private incentives may be insufficient to provide an appropriate 
level of cybersecurity.”127 In discussing a general approach to 
principles for government incentives, the Treasury Report observed: 
Generally, government policy tools to provide incentives to private sector 
participants should be considered when private incentives are insufficient 
to provide a desirable level of additional investment in an area, such as 
increasing cybersecurity. Economists refer to this condition as market 
failure . . . .  
When a market failure exists and private market solutions are inadequate, 
government support in the form of incentives may be appropriate. If a 
government role is warranted, the potential incentive should ideally: (i) be 
appropriately tailored and scaled to the magnitude of the under-investment 
in cybersecurity; (ii) protect taxpayers by being cost-effective while still 
achieving the policy objectives; (iii) adjust to changing circumstances and 
the availability of new information; (iv) be coordinated, so as not to 
duplicate, other incentives; and (v) motivate private sector entities to 
expend their own resources to further protect their critical infrastructure 
assets. These principles should be crucial factors in ant decision about 
whether the government should provide incentives; however, they should 
not be viewed as requirements.128 
The Treasury Report further identifies and discusses the following 
cybersecurity market failures: underinvestment in knowledge; barriers 
to information sharing; coordination failures; network externalities; 
and adverse selection of insurance risks.129 Next, the Treasury Report 
turns to a discussion and evaluation of potential government incentives, 
including: enhancing information usage capabilities to support 
information sharing; leveraging framework adoption to clarify liability 
risk; government funding to encourage basic cybersecurity research; 
providing technical assistance; further accelerating the security 
clearance process; potential tax incentives; and cyber insurance.130 
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H. Framework on Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity 
Executive Order 13636 mandates “development of a voluntary 
risk-based Cybersecurity Framework—a set of industry standards and 
best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks. The 
resulting Framework, created through collaboration between 
government and the private sector, uses a common language to address 
and manage cybersecurity risk.”131 Sensitive to imposing additional 
regulatory requirements on business, the Framework attempts to focus 
on business needs in a cost-effective way.132 As a threshold 
observation, “The Framework complements, and does not replace, an 
organization’s risk management process and cybersecurity program. 
An organization can use its current processes and leverage the 
Framework to identify opportunities to strengthen and communicate its 
management of cybersecurity risk while aligning with industry 
practices.”133 Important to many, “an organization without an existing 
cybersecurity program can use the Framework as a reference to 
establish one.”134 
1. Each Enterprise’s Need Is Unique 
The Framework recognizes that risk management of cybersecurity 
requires “a clear understanding of the organization’s business drivers 
and security considerations specific to its use of [information 
technology] and [industrial control systems] is required. Because each 
organization’s risk is unique . . . the tools and methods used to achieve 
the outcomes described by the Framework will vary.”135 Accordingly: 
The Framework focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity 
activities and considering cybersecurity risk as part of the organization’s 
risk management process. The Framework consists of three parts: the 
Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and the Framework 
Implementation Tiers. The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity 
activities, outcomes, and informative references that are common across 
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critical infrastructure sectors, providing the detailed guidance for 
developing individual organizational Profiles. Through use of the Profiles, 
the Framework will help the organization align its cybersecurity activities 
with its business requirements, risk tolerances, and resources. The Tiers 
provide a mechanism for organizations to view and understand the 
characteristics of their approach to managing cybersecurity risk . . . . 
The Framework enables organizations—regardless of size, degree of 
cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication—to apply the principles 
and best practices of risk management to improving the security and 
resilience of critical infrastructure. The Framework provides organization 
and structure to today’s multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling 
standards, guidelines, and practices that are working effectively in industry 
today . . . .136 
2. The Framework Is Organic 
Designed as “a model for international cooperation on 
strengthening critical infrastructure cybersecurity,” the Framework 
“references globally recognized standards for cybersecurity.”137 
Accordingly, the Framework is intended to be: 
[A] living document and will continue to be updated and improved as 
industry provides feedback on implementation. As the Framework is put 
into practice, lessons learned will be integrated into future versions. This 
will ensure it is meeting the needs of critical infrastructure owners and 
operators in a dynamic and challenging environment of new threats, risks, 
and solutions. 
Use of this voluntary framework is the next step to improve the 
cybersecurity of our Nation’s critical infrastructure  ̶ providing guidance for 
individual organizations, while increasing the cybersecurity posture of the 
Nation’s critical infrastructure as a whole.138 
The Framework is designed to “be used with a broad array of 
cybersecurity risk management processes. Examples of cybersecurity 
risk management processes include International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 31000:2009,139 ISO/IEC 27005:2011,140 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special 
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Publication (SP) 800-39,141 and the Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity 
Risk Management Process (RMP) guideline.142 All charged with the 
responsibility for cybersecurity governance should obtain and become 
familiar with The Framework. This is a roadmap for having a dialogue 
about cybersecurity in any organization. 
I. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (“2014 Review”) 
The Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission 
areas and risk-informed priorities stated that “the terrorist threat in 
increasingly decentralized and may be harder to detect. Cyber threats 
are growing and pose ever-greater concern to our critical infrastructure 
systems as they become increasingly interdependent.”143 In addition, 
the 2014 Review observed: 
We must, over the next four years, continue efforts to address the growing 
cyber threat, illustrated by the real, pervasive, and ongoing series of attacks 
on our public and private infrastructure. This infrastructure provides 
essential services such as energy, telecommunications, water, 
transportation, and financial services and is increasingly subject to 
sophisticated cyber intrusions which pose new risks. As the Federal 
Government’s coordinator of efforts to counter cyber threats and other 
hazards to critical infrastructure, DHS must work with both public and 
private sector partners to share information, help make sure new 
infrastructure is designed and built to be more secure and resilient, and 
continue advocating internationally for openness and security of the internet 
and harmony across international laws to combat cybercrime. Further, DHS 
must secure the Federal Government’s information technology systems by 
approaching federal systems and networks as an integrated whole and by 
researching, developing, and rapidly deploying cybersecurity solutions and 
services at the pace that cyber threats evolve. And finally, we must continue 
to develop cyber law enforcement, incident response, and reporting 
capabilities by increasing the number and inpact of cybercrime 
investigations, sharing information about tactics and methods of cyber 
criminals gleaned through investigations, and ensuring that incidents 
reported to any federal department or agency are shared across the U.S. 
government. In addition, the Federal Government must continue to develop 
good working relationships with the private sector, lower barriers to 
partnership, develop cybersecurity best practices, promote advanced 
technology that can exchange information at machine speed, and build the 
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cyber workforce of tomorrow for DHS and the Nation.144 
The 2014 Review provides a description of the strategic 
environment, guiding principles, strategic priorities such as securing 
against the evolving threat of terrorism, biological hazards and threats, 
potential nuclear terrorism, immigration challenges, and associated 
issues.145 The 2014 Review also noted that: 
Transnational criminal organizations rely on revenues generated through 
the sale of illegal drugs and counterfeit goods, human trafficking and 
smuggling, and other criminal activities. These organizations continue to 
expand in size, scope, and influence and are capitalizing on technological 
innovation, including new platforms to sell illicit goods, innovative ways 
of moving money, tools for coordinating operations, and a variety of other 
criminal and cyber activities… 
 As transnational criminal organizations grow stronger and challenge or 
corrupt governments in many regions, they are moving more freely, 
expanding their networks, and acquiring and distributing military-grade 
equipment. Violent extremist networks can also conduct these profitable 
criminal activities on their own, exploiting the same vulnerabilities in 
finance, trade and travel, and immigration.146 
The 2014 Review notes that “Cyberspace and its underlying 
infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of risk stemming from 
both physical and cyber threats and hazards. Sophisticated cyber actors 
and nation states exploit vulnerabilities to steal information and money 
and are developing capabilities to disrupt, destroy, or threaten the 
delivery of essential services.”147 Cyberspace has brought 
technological advantage to traditional crimes, including “the 
production and distribution of child pornography and child exploitation 
conspiracies, banking and financial fraud, intellectual property 
violations, and other crimes, all of which have substantial human and 
economic consequences.”148 The DHS has articulated its mission as 
“Mission 4: Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace” and is included here as 
Exhibit Two. 
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Exhibit Two:  
DHS Mission 4: Safeguard & Secure Cyberspace 
Goal 4.1: Strengthen the Security and Resilience of Critical 
Infrastructure 
Enhance the exchange of information and intelligence on risks to critical 
infrastructure and develop real-time situational awareness capabilities that 
ensure machine and human interpretation and visualization; 
Partner with critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure the 
delivery of essential services and functions; 
Identify and understand interdependencies and cascading impacts among 
critical infrastructure systems; 
Collaborate with agencies and the private sector to identify and develop 
effective cybersecurity policies and best practices; and 
Reduce vulnerabilities and promote resilient critical infrastructure design. 
Goal 4.2: Secure the Federal Civilian Government Information 
Technology Enterprise 
Coordinate government purchasing of cyber technology to enhance cost-
effectiveness 
Equip civilian government networks with innovative cybersecurity tools 
and protections; and 
Ensure government-wide policies and standards are consistently and 
effectively implemented and measured. 
Goal 4.3: Advance Law Enforcement, Incident Response, and 
Reporting Capabilities 
Respond to and assist in the recovery from cyber incidents; and 
Deter, disrupt, and investigate cybercrime. 
Goal 4.4: Strengthen the Ecosystem 
Drive innovative and cost effective security products, services, and 
solutions throughout the cyber ecosystem; 
Conduct and transition research and development, enabling trustworthy 
cyber infrastructure; 
Develop skilled cybersecurity professionals; enhance public awareness and 
promote cybersecurity best practices; and 
Advance international engagement to promote capacity building, 
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international standards, and cooperation.149 
J. Congressional Cybersecurity Action 
During December 2014, just hours before the holiday recess, the 
U.S. Congress passed several major legislative proposals designed to 
enhance U.S. cybersecurity: The National Cybersecurity Protection 
Act of 2014;150 The Federal Information Security Modernization Act 
of 2014;151 The Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act;152 The 
Homeland Security Workforce Assessment Act;153 and the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014.154 Following signature by the 
President, these became the first cybersecurity laws to be enacted in 
over a decade, since passage of the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002.155 
IV.  CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK GOVERNANCE 
The following regulatory developments deserve the attention of 
top management and those responsible for cybersecurity governance of 
any enterprise. Accordingly, attention is given to a discussion of recent 
comments by the SEC on risk, Dodd-Frank legislation, and SEC 
disclosure guidelines. 
A. The SEC on Risk & Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
Effective February 28, 2010, SEC rules amended Regulation S-K 
(Item 407) to require disclosure about the board’s role in a company’s 
risk oversight process and its leadership structure.156 The SEC noted: 
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According to the SEC’s final rule release, the new disclosure rules require 
“companies.… to describe how the board administers its risk oversight 
function, such as through the whole board, or through a separate risk 
committee or the audit committee, for example.”157 Disclosures should 
address, for example, “whether the individuals who supervise the day-to-
day risk management responsibilities report directly to the board as a whole 
or to a board committee or how the board or committee otherwise receives 
information from such individuals.”158 Such disclosures should also include 
an explanation of the board’s leadership structure and the “reasons why the 
company believes that this board leadership structure is the most 
appropriate structure for the company.”159 In companies in which the CEO 
and Chairman are the same individual, rule “amendments will require 
disclosure of whether and why the company has a lead independent director, 
as well as the specific role the lead independent director plays in the 
leadership of the company.”160 
Large financial institutions are required by the Dodd-Frank Act to 
establish independent risk committees on their boards,161 with at least 
one member of the committee required to have risk management 
experience at a large, complex firm.162 Highly disruptive developments 
such as Bitcoin’s blockchain technology continue to confront financial 
service providers with substantial risk management issues.163 This 
comes at a time when many of the world’s largest financial institutions 
are still engaged in recovering and rebuilding capital after the global 
financial collapse of 2007-2008.164 
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Creation of a risk committee is one pro-active approach to the 
increased emphasis on risk oversight and the possibility of risk 
committees being mandated for some or all public companies.165 As 
observed elsewhere, “While having a stand-alone risk committee can 
serve to relieve strained audit committees, it is important that qualified, 
independent directors serve on the risk committee. It is also imperative 
that creating a risk committee does not abdicate all responsibility for 
risk away from the rest of the directors.”166  
B. SEC Disclosure Guidelines 
The proliferation of cyberattacks during 2010 and 2011 resulted 
in the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance announcing disclosure 
guidance for cybersecurity issues on October 13, 2011.167 The Division 
of Corporation Finance stated: “For a number of years, registrants have 
migrated toward increasing dependence on digital technologies to 
conduct their operations. As this dependence has increased, the risks to 
registrants associated with cybersecurity have also increased, resulting 
in more frequent and severe cyber incidents.”168 In addition, “there has 
been increased focus by registrants and members of the legal and 
accounting professions on how these risks and their related impact on 
the operations of a registrant should be described within the framework 
of the disclosure obligations imposed by the federal securities laws.”169 
Accordingly, the Division “determined that it would be beneficial to 
provide guidance that assists registrants in assessing what, if any, 
disclosures should be provided about cybersecurity matters in light of 
each registrant’s specific facts and circumstances.”170 The Division 
prepared guidance to:  
Be consistent with the relevant disclosure considerations that arise in 
connection with any business risk. We are mindful of potential concerns 
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that detailed disclosures could compromise cybersecurity efforts -- for 
example, by providing a “roadmap” for those who seek to infiltrate a 
registrant’s network security -- and we emphasize that disclosures of that 
nature are not required under the federal securities laws.  
In general, cyber incidents can result from deliberate attacks or 
unintentional events. We have observed an increased level of attention 
focused on cyber attacks that include, but are not limited to, gaining 
unauthorized access to digital systems for purposes of misappropriating 
assets or sensitive information, corrupting data, or causing operational 
disruption. Cyber attacks may also be carried out in a manner that does not 
require gaining unauthorized access, such as by causing denial-of-service 
attacks on websites. Cyber attacks may be carried out by third parties or 
insiders using techniques that range from highly sophisticated efforts to 
electronically circumvent network security or overwhelm websites to more 
traditional intelligence gathering and social engineering aimed at obtaining 
information necessary to gain access.  
The objectives of cyber attacks vary widely and may include theft of 
financial assets, intellectual property, or other sensitive information 
belonging to registrants, their customers, or other business partners. Cyber 
attacks may also be directed at disrupting the operations of registrants or 
their business partners. Registrants that fall victim to successful cyber 
attacks may incur substantial costs and suffer other negative consequences, 
which may include, but are not limited to:  
• Remediation costs that may include liability for stolen assets or 
information and repairing system damage that may have been 
caused. Remediation costs may also include incentives offered to 
customers or other business partners in an effort to maintain the 
business relationships after an attack;  
• Increased cybersecurity protection costs that may include 
organizational changes, deploying additional personnel and 
protection technologies, training employees, and engaging third 
party experts and consultants;  
• Lost revenues resulting from unauthorized use of proprietary 
information or the failure to retain or attract customers following 
an attack;  
• Litigation; and  
• Reputational damage adversely affecting customer or investor 
confidence 
The Division further stated that 
Registrants should disclose the risk of cyber incidents if these issues are 
among the most significant factors that make an investment in the company 
speculative or risky. In determining whether risk factor disclosure is 
required, we expect registrants to evaluate their cybersecurity risks and take 
into account all available relevant information, including prior cyber 
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incidents and the severity and frequency of those incidents. As part of this 
evaluation, registrants should consider the probability of cyber incidents 
occurring and the quantitative and qualitative magnitude of those risks, 
including the potential costs and other consequences resulting from 
misappropriation of assets or sensitive information, corruption of data or 
operational disruption. In evaluating whether risk factor disclosure should 
be provided, registrants should also consider the adequacy of preventative 
actions taken to reduce cybersecurity risks in the context of the industry in 
which they operate and risks to that security, including threatened attacks 
of which they are aware . . . .171  
V.  BOARD COMPOSITION: THE CASE FOR CYBERSECURITY 
EXPERTISE 
A. Each Board Has Different Levels of IT and Cybersecurity 
Skills 
Optimal corporate board composition is different for companies 
engaged in different industries and at different stages of their 
lifecycle.172 The board of a young software or consulting company may 
be inundated with information technology (IT) understanding, 
expertise and talent; while the board of an oil and gas or fast food 
company may have little understanding of IT issues. IT domain issues 
must be adequately represented among corporate board members, 
particularly for companies having significant cybersecurity risks 
related to their business activities, such as internet-based sales. 
It’s a safe bet that no corporate directors were born with a 
comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity and information 
technology. Accordingly, “some boards provide directors with IT 
education sessions outside the boardroom, similar to strategy retreats, 
which may be held on the day before or after a full board meeting.”173 
Deloitte suggests that “a first session may focus on the organization’s 
overall IT structure and objectives, while subsequent sessions may be 
scheduled whenever a major IT development occurs.”174 
B. Organizational IT and Cybersecurity Knowledge  
It appears “relatively few boards draw upon what may be the best 
source of IT knowledge within the organization—the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO).” Deloitte suggests that “boards should 
																																								 																				
 171. Id. 
 172. See generally Trautman, supra note 8, at 88.  
 173. Deloitte Report, The Tech-Intelligent Board: Priorities for Tech-Savvy Directors as 
they oversee IT Risk and Strategy, at 9 (2011), http://bit.do/Tech-IntelligentBoard. 
 174. Id. 
2016] MANAGING CYBERTHREAT  271 
	
establish a regular reporting relationship with the CIO, similar to the 
relationship with the CFO on financial issues, to ensure that IT 
communications flow smoothly to the board.”175 That is, the language 
of “business” is required for effectiveness, not the nomenclature of 
technology. Also, “it may be easier and faster for directors and the CIO 
to develop an effective rapport when the board members have the 
opportunity to interact with the CIO outside the boardroom, for 
example, at a combined board/management dinner prior to a board 
meeting.”176 
C. The Audit Committee: Appropriate Site for IT Expertise and 
Experience 
Because the Audit Committee is responsible for quality control, 
internal accounting controls, and risk assessment, an understanding of 
the enterprises’ IT logically seems to be a foundation issue before audit 
quality, internal accounting controls, or risk assessment can be 
addressed.177 A key responsibility of the internal audit function is to 
keep the board’s audit committee “apprised of emerging [IT] risks” 
says PricewaterhouseCoopers, observing that “in the risk assessment 
report that it presents to the audit committee, internal audit should 
highlight the organization’s significant data security and privacy risks, 
including any new risks.”178 Moreover, the Audit Committee 
Should identify weaknesses in policies and controls. At one global financial 
services firm, for example, the internal audit function briefs the audit 
committee about risks it sees within the company, both present and 
potential. In turn, the company’s audit committee often alerts internal audit 
and management to emerging security issues that directors hear about at 
other firms with which they are involved. Such two-way exchanges 
between internal audit and the audit committee are invaluable in keeping 
the spotlight on emerging information security risks. 
Because the nature of information security risks is evolving continuously, 
internal audit functions need to stay ahead of the threat curve. Internal audit 
functions should participate in numerous internal and external forums to 
stay plugged in to emerging security threats, and practices for protecting 
against them. Networking internally and externally on information security 
issues is vital to staying vigilant. 
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Internal audit’s role in ensuring that information security threats are 
properly considered becomes especially important when a company is 
ready to roll out a new business process, product, or information system. In 
such initiatives, the project team does not always believe it has time to fully 
consider data security, particularly if the initiative has fallen behind 
schedule…. Internal audit is uniquely positioned to assess whether existing 
controls are being used, but it must also keep its ear to the ground and move 
quickly to conduct special audits for new information security threats, 
which some executives consider as important as regularly scheduled 
audits.179 
D. Barriers to IT-Internal Audit Effectiveness 
PwC believes that “for most companies, information security and 
privacy is [a] critical risk because of its potential to cause financial and 
reputational damage, and because it is so difficult to mitigate” and that 
data security attacks may best be combated through the use of three 
primary lines of defense: Management; Risk Management and 
Compliance Functions; and Internal Audit.180 The PwC report 
“commonly find[s] four barriers in organizations that try to adopt 
effective data privacy and security measures: 
1. A mindset that believes adequate controls are already in place; 
2. Cost; 
3. Low expectations of internal audit’s capabilities in data privacy; and 
4. Fragmented responsibilities.181 
VI.  YOUR CYBERSECURITY CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN 
Every enterprise should have a cybersecurity crisis management 
plan in place before a disaster occurs, since “advance planning is a key 
prevention measure for any business. In an emergency incident 
response situation, a well-written and properly socialized incident 
response plan will be the best method to inform the relevant 
stakeholders, identify the incident, and contain the security breach.”182 
In addition, 
Often times during an emergency situation, well-intentioned administrators 
make changes that either disrupt the business or jeopardize the integrity of 
the digital evidence. It is critical that the incident response plan lays out a 
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proper chain of command. 
Companies should also perform a mock-incident response training scenario 
once a year to ensure adoption of the plan and its effectiveness, as a well-
oiled machine functions much more efficiently than a rusty one. A mock-
incident exercise will also test the viability of the written plan. Finally, 
companies should work with a team of dedicated IT security experts who 
are knowledgeable and experienced in dealing with IT security threats and 
incident response. This can be an internal team or an external partner. It 
may not always make sense for every organization to have this level of 
expertise in-house, thus partnering with a reputable company may be the 
more reasonable solution.183  
Every enterprise can implement the following elements of a crisis 
management plan before a crisis takes place. Of particular importance, 
identifying and having a relationship with the professionals needed to 
assist in stressful times is always best handled when sufficient time is 
available to make reasoned decisions. A cyber disaster requires making 
decisions about: 
1. Damage Assessment: How you intend to ascertain exactly 
what has happened. 
2. Public Relations: How you intend to respond (since timeliness 
is critical). 
3. Need for Outside Assistance: Who is needed to assist you 
with this highly technical problem. 
4. Resources needed to cure defects that allowed this breach to 
happen. 
5. How you intend to monitor & prevent future reoccurrences.184 
Hyundai Capital Services Inc., South Korea’s largest consumer-
finance company, sustained a computer system hack and blackmail 
attempt from two groups of hackers.185 Mr. Chung, Hundai Capital’s 
chief executive, believed:  
His biggest mistake was that he used to treat the information-technology 
department as simply one of many units that helped the company get its 
main job done. Learning from this hacking experience, he now treats the 
Information Technology function as “central to everything the company 
does. Since the attack, Mr. Chung has spent weeks learning the ins and outs 
of network architecture, security infrastructure and the tradeoffs between 
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data protection and customer satisfaction. 
The IT department, which has added a security unit, now reports directly to 
the CEO. The company has slowed the introduction of several new products 
to ensure they don’t create new holes in security.186 
VII.  A CALL TO ACTION: WHAT YOU CAN DO, NOW! 
We now turn our attention to specific recommendations about 
what every organization can do to increase their cybersecurity 
defenses. Professor Frederick Chang paraphrases 19th century engineer 
and mathematical physicist Lord Kelvin to say that “you can’t manage 
what you don’t measure.”187 While important cybersecurity defense 
work 
[i]s taking place, we need improvements in hard, objective metrics and 
measures of security. Metrics are needed at many very practical levels. At 
a very tactical level, how do you know if computer system A is more or less 
secure than computer system B? Is computer system A more or less secure 
than it was last month? Last year? At a corporate level, how do you measure 
the security of your corporate information technology infrastructure? Is it 
more secure now than it was last year? Do the measures allow a pinpoint 
assessment of where corporate improvements are necessary? At a much 
more macro level, what metrics are best used to determine if the industry as 
a whole is making progress toward improving its cybersecurity posture? 
How would you measure the effect of an important government policy 
change in cybersecurity? Is it making the difference that was intended? It is 
relatively straightforward to determine the effects of changing the speed 
limit on [traffic] accidents. It won’t be so clear for cybersecurity. 
Developing a disciplined, agreed-upon, and readily implementable set of 
metrics for cybersecurity remains a hard problem. Perhaps we can look for 
some assistance from other fields  ̶ medical research has successfully 
employed metrics to improve the science of human health. Measures of 
human health and cyber health share an important common ingredient: in 
both cases we are attempting to measure the absence of something bad 
(human disease or system compromise).188  
Lessons to be learned from those on the front lines of 
cybersecurity defense include: leadership commitment at the top; focus 
on basic cyber hygiene; the SANS Institute Critical Security Controls; 
the OWASP Top Ten list; CWE/SANS Top 25 most dangerous 
software errors list; the DHS National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT); thoughts about the role and 
																																								 																				
 186. Id. 
 187. See Chang testimony, supra note 14. 
 188. Id. 
2016] MANAGING CYBERTHREAT  275 
	
value of a chief Information Officer; and the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’s list of ten ways to improve cybersecurity.  
A. Leadership Commitment at the Top 
Like any other challenge requiring enterprise resources of 
significant time and money, to be successful, governance of IT and 
cybersecurity issues require commitment at the very top. Deloitte states 
that it is difficult to get IT issues on the board agenda because “in some 
cases, the board lacks members with the appropriate experience and 
expertise to be comfortable in addressing issues related to IT.”189 In 
many organizations, “senior technology officers are poorly equipped to 
communicate and work with the board. And when management and the 
board have not previously established clear and consistent 
communications on IT matters, IT often remains a foreign topic in the 
boardroom.”190 The challenges associated with achieving 
understanding and management of the risks involved with 
implementing new technologies may appear almost insurmountable. 
Every corporation’s IT challenges and concerns will include: 
• Recognizing the importance of IT at the highest 
(board) level and settling upon goals and necessary 
resources 
• Aligning IT strategy with the business strategy 
• Cascading strategy and goals down into the enterprise 
• Providing organizational structures that facilitate the 
implementation of strategy and goals 
• Insisting that an IT control framework be adopted and 
implemented 
• Measuring IT’s performance191 
B. Basic Cyber Hygiene 
Perhaps the most significant step that can be taken to prevent 
cyber intrusion in your organization is to require frequent changes to 
passwords. It is the weakest link in technology systems that often 
define security issues: 
Hackers need just one way in. As technical security measures improve (e.g. 
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greater use of encryption), then people increasingly become the weakest 
link. Hackers often employ a tactic known as ‘social engineering’ to trick 
computer operators to divulge sensitive information that can be used to 
compromise a system (e.g. a password). These tactics can be extremely 
effective and much easier to accomplish than a technical compromise. 
Indeed the well-known hacker Kevin Mitnick reported in testimony to 
Congress that he was so successful in social engineering that he rarely had 
to resort to a technical attack. More generally, there are a well-known set of 
cognitive biases that people use to assess risk and make decisions. These 
biases often cloud our reasoning and cause us to improperly assess risk, in 
many domains, including in cyberspace. We must take steps to strengthen 
the weakest link. Gaining a much richer understanding of the cognitive 
biases at work in the context of decision-making in cyberspace would be 
just one of many important issues that need research at the intersection of 
psychology and cybersecurity.192 
C. SANS Institute Critical Security Controls 
 Over the years the National Security Agency (NSA) became 
increasingly concerned that, in everyday practice, efforts to govern data 
systems and prevent breaches, had all too often become “exercises in 
reporting on compliance and have actually diverted security program 
resources from the constantly evolving attacks that must be 
addressed.”193 Accordingly, during 2008 NSA started “prioritizing a 
list of the controls that would have the greatest impact in improving 
risk posture against real-world threats. A consortium of U.S. and 
international agencies quickly grew, and was joined by experts from 
private industry and around the globe.”194 This list ultimately became 
known as the Critical Security Controls and was coordinated through 
the SANS Institute. The Council on CyberSecurity, a global, 
independent, non-profit entity committed to a secure and open Internet 
assumed responsibility during 2013. SANS noted that: 
The Critical Security Controls focuses first on prioritizing security 
functions that are effective against the latest Advanced Targeted Threats, 
with a strong emphasis on “What Works” - security controls where 
products, processes, architectures and services are in use that have 
demonstrated real world effectiveness. Standardization and automation is 
another top priority, to gain operational efficiencies while also improving 
effectiveness. The actions defined by the Controls are demonstrably a 
subset of the comprehensive catalog defined by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-53. The Controls do not attempt 
to replace the work of NIST, including the Cybersecurity Framework 
developed in response to Executive Order 13636. The Controls instead 
																																								 																				
 192. Chang testimony, supra note 14. 
 193. The CIS Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense, SANS INSTITUTE, 
http://bit.do/CriticalSecurityControls. 
 194. Id. 
2016] MANAGING CYBERTHREAT  277 
	
prioritize and focus on a smaller number of actionable controls with high-
payoff, aiming for a “must do first” philosophy. Since the Controls were 
derived from the most common attack patterns and were vetted across a 
very broad community of government and industry, with very strong 
consensus on the resulting set of controls, they serve as the basis for 
immediate high-value action.195 
Exhibit Three is “Critical Security Controls: Version 5.” More 
information and a description regarding each of these component part 
items may be found at the SANS Institute website.196  
 
Exhibit Three: 
SANS Critical Security Controls: Version 5 
 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices  
 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software  
 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on 
Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers  
 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation  
 5: Malware Defenses  
 6: Application Software Security  
 7: Wireless Access Control  
 8: Data Recovery Capability  
 9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to 
Fill Gaps  
10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as 
Firewalls, Routers, and Switches  
11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and 
Services  
12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges  
13: Boundary Defense  
14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs  
15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know  
16: Account Monitoring and Control  
17: Data Protection  
18: Incident Response and Management  
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19: Secure Network Engineering  
20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises  
D. OWASP Top Ten  
The Open Web Application Project (OWASP) is a world-wide 
not-for-profit organization having a stated mission of making 
“software security visible so that individuals and organizations 
worldwide can make informed decisions about true software security 
risks.”197 The OWASP website reports: eighty-seven chapters in the 
United States; twelve in Canada; thirty-nine in Latin America; sixty in 
Europe; sixty-one in Asia/Pacific/Middle East; sixteen in Africa; and 
eight student chapters.198 The OWASP top ten has been translated into 
many different languages and represents a broad consensus of OWASP 
members about location of the most critical web application security 
flaws and is depicted in Exhibit Four below.199  
 
Exhibit Four: 
Open Web Application Project (OWASP) Top 10 List, 2013 
A1 Injection  
A2 Broken Authentication and Session Management  
A3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)  
A4 Insecure Direct Object References  
A5 Security Misconfiguration  
A6 Sensitive Data Exposure  
A7 Missing Function Level Access Control  
A8 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)  
A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities  
A10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards  
Source: OWASP Top 10 – 2013 
OWASP urges all organizations to “adopt this awareness 
document within their organization and start the process of ensuring 
that their web applications do not contain these flaws. Adopting the 
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OWASP Top Ten is perhaps the most effective first step towards 
changing the software development culture within your organization 
into one that produces secure code.”200 Also available at the OWASP 
website are a number of other valuable tools, including: OWASP 
Mobile Top 10 Risks; OWASO Top 10 Cheat Sheet; Top 10 Proactive 
Controls; and OWASP Top 10 Mapped to the Web Hacking Incident 
Database.201 
E. CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors 
Another source of useful threat assessment tools is The Common 
Weakness Scoring System (CWSS).202 The CWSS “provides a 
mechanism for prioritizing software weaknesses in a consistent, 
flexible, open manner. It is a collaborative, community-based effort 
that is addressing the needs of its stakeholders across government, 
academia, and industry.”203 Often software developers “face hundreds 
or thousands of individual bug reports for weaknesses that are 
discovered in their code. In certain circumstances, a software weakness 
can even lead to an exploitable vulnerability.”204 The CWSS reports 
that: 
Due to this high volume of reported weakness, stakeholders are often forced 
to prioritize which issues they should investigate and fix first, often using 
incomplete information. In short, people need to be able to reason and 
communicate about the relative importance of different weaknesses. While 
various scoring methods are used today, they are either ad hoc or 
inappropriate for application to the still-imprecise evaluation of software 
security. 
Software developers, managers, testers, security vendors and service 
suppliers, buyers, application vendors, and researchers must identify and 
assess weaknesses in software that could manifest as vulnerabilities when 
the software is used. They then need to be able to prioritize these 
weaknesses and determine which to remediate based on which of them pose 
the greatest risk. When there are so many weaknesses to fix, with each being 
scored using different scales, and often operating with incomplete 
information, the various community members, managers, testers, buyers, 
and developers are left to their own methodologies to find some way of 
comparing disparate weaknesses and translating them into actionable 
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information.205 
The CWSS offers quantitative measurements, a common 
framework for prioritizing software application security weaknesses, 
and the ability to customize priorities.206 Further, the CWSS “is 
organized into three metric groups, with each group offering multiple 
metrics: the base finding; attack surface; and environmental metric 
groups.207 An attempt was made in the 2010 SANS/CWE Top 25 Most 
Dangerous Errors list “to perform quantitative prioritization of CWE 
entries using a combination of Prevalence and Importance, which 
became the basis of CWSS 0.1 later in the year.”208 Forty-one candidate 
weaknesses were rated by survey and used to generate a “Top 25” list. 
In addition: 
The 2010 Top 25 was structured in a way to support multiple points of view 
that could reflect different prioritizations of the weaknesses. The creation 
of separate focus profiles stemmed from some critiques of the original 2009 
Top 25, in which a generalized Top 25 list would not necessarily be useful 
to all audiences, and that a customized prioritization would be ideal. Eight 
focus profiles were provided with the 2010 Top 25. For example, the 
Educational Emphasis focus profile evaluated weaknesses that are regarded 
as important from an educational perspective within a school or university 
context. It emphasized the CWE entries that graduating students should 
know, including weaknesses that were historically important or increased 
the breadth of coverage. A separate focus profile ranked weaknesses based 
solely on their evaluated Importance, which would be useful to software 
customers who want the most serious issues removed, without 
consideration for how frequently they occur or how resource-intensive it is 
to fix. These ranking-oriented focus profiles made the Top 25 more useful 
to certain audiences, and their construction and management have served as 
a useful predecessor to CWSS and vignettes.209 
F. U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 
The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is 
the 24-hour operational arm of the DHS National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). CERT is designed to 
lead “efforts to improve the nation’s cybersecurity posture, coordinate 
cyber information sharing, and proactively manage cyber risks to the 
Nation while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans. US-
CERT strives to be a trusted global leader in cybersecurity—
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collaborative, agile, and responsive in a dynamic and complex 
environment.”210 CERT describes its mission as follows: 
Through its 24x7 operations center, US-CERT accepts, triages, and 
collaboratively responds to incidents; provides technical assistance to 
information system operators; and disseminates timely notifications 
regarding current and potential security threats and vulnerabilities… US-
CERT leverages the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) 
Program to prevent inappropriate disclosure of proprietary information or 
other sensitive data. Established in response to the Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act of 2002 (CII Act), the PCII Program enables members of 
the private sector to voluntarily submit confidential information regarding 
the nation’s critical infrastructure to DHS with the assurance that the 
information will be protected from public disclosure.211 
Through its National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS), CERT is a 
valuable source of information about cyber threats and software 
vulnerability. In addition, it is an appropriate place to report breaches 
and other related matters. Interested parties can find valuable cyber 
information at the CERT website and subscribe to data feeds and 
mailing lists.  
G. Role and Value of Chief Information Security Officer 
Information technology governance may benefit from the 
presence of a skilled Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). 
Professor Scott Shackelford says that “most would have thought that, 
as a leading IT company, Sony would have had a senior manager 
devoted to information security,”212  
Yet when the company was hacked in April 2011, it did not have a Chief 
Information Security Officer. Firms with a CISC (or equivalent title) have 
been reported to experience fewer costs when a breach occurred: $157 per 
record, versus $236 per record for firms without strategic security 
leadership that is part of overall enterprise risk management.213 
H. Ten Ways to Improve Cybersecurity 
Pinguelo and Muller note that “although companies cannot 
prevent all hacking incidents . . . relatively simple measures—
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combined with diligent employee training, custom technology tools 
tailored to a business’ needs, and through incident response planning—
can help improve a company’s cybersecurity and prepare it to respond 
effectively to those incidents that do occur.”214 Elsewhere, I’ve cited a 
useful list of ten measures to improve cybersecurity and response to 
attacks provided by Pinguelo and Muller.215  
Exhibit Five, created by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to 
address the needs of commercial banks, is a list of ten questions any 
enterprise can use to think about cybersecurity. While drafted to meet 
the particular needs of banks, these questions may be tailored to fit the 
needs of any line of business. Deputy Treasury Secretary Sarah Bloom 
Raskin explains that “at Treasury we have framed our thinking about 
cybersecurity and financial industry preparedness against cyber-attacks 
around three categories of activities: (1) baseline protections, (2) 
information sharing, and (3) response and recovery.”216 
Exhibit Five:  
U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 
Ten Questions in Thinking About Cybersecurity 
… baseline protections are the policies, procedures, and other controls that 
[are] adopted to prevent penetration of their networks and systems, and to 
prevent damage assuming that there has been access. 
1. Is cyber risk part of our current risk management framework? 
Banks should have risk management frameworks that are appropriately 
tailored to the cyber risks presented by their specific businesses and 
operations. Ideally, your cybersecurity risk management is part and parcel 
of your enterprise risk management framework, key components of which 
are technology, process, and people.  
CEOs and boards of directors should identify the cyber threats presented by 
their particular activities and operations and match those threats to 
appropriate technology solutions. Then CEOs and boards should adopt 
policies, procedures, and other controls—like training and governance—to 
not only address identified cyber threats that their technology solutions 
cannot control, but also to reasonably anticipate possible breakdowns and 
overrides of that technology.  
  Finally, CEOs and boards should do their best to employ highly qualified 
people to monitor and continually reassess the effectiveness of the deployed 
technology and controls, including those technologies or controls which are 
not directly operated by the institution. When appropriately designed and 
executed, technology, process, and people form a risk management 
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structure and the necessary first lines of defense against cyber-attacks.  
2. Do we follow the NIST Cybersecurity Framework? The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST… released the Framework 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity in February [2014]. The 
NIST Cyber Framework is a well-considered approach to strengthening the 
resilience of critical infrastructure. Banks should use the framework to 
reduce cybersecurity threats both within the bank and with outside vendors.  
The framework is a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity that can 
help identify your bank’s cyber posture and determine its risk profile and 
tolerance. Importantly, the framework is not a technical document; it 
focuses on oversight process for management and governance. For 
example, it provides advice on how to develop organizational 
communication plans for responding to attacks, and provides a common 
language and set of practices, standards, and guidelines. And for 
organizations that have developed enterprise-risk management approaches, 
the NIST framework need not replace those approaches; instead the 
framework can be used to better inform and apply those established risk-
management approaches when the risks and associated controls are cyber-
related. The NIST framework also provides firms with a tool to evaluate 
vendors and other third-parties that have access to their networks, systems, 
and data…  
3. Do we know the cyber risks that our vendors and third-party service 
providers expose us to, and do we know the rigor of their cybersecurity 
controls? Third-party vendors—and any other third parties with access to 
a firm’s networks, systems, and data—can present a significant 
cybersecurity hazard. As you know, given the nature of modern IT services, 
many banks do not own or operate their systems for payment services or 
other back-office processes. This means that personnel with access to your 
networks, systems, and data may not even be employed by your bank.  
  As such, it is imperative that you understand the security safeguards that 
your vendors and other relevant third-parties have in place. At a minimum, 
this means four things: (1) knowing all vendors and third-parties with 
access to your systems and data, (2) ensuring that those third parties have 
appropriate protections to safeguard your systems and data, (3) conducting 
ongoing monitoring to ensure adherence to protections, and (4) 
documenting protections and related obligations in your contracts.   
4. Do we have cyber risk insurance? And if we do, what does it cover 
and exclude? Is our coverage adequate based on our cyber risk exposure? 
While the cyber insurance market is relatively new, it is growing. More than 
fifty carriers now offer some type of cyber insurance coverage.  
Unlike the past, now some form of cyber coverage exists for organizations 
of all sizes, from small, family-owned shops to Fortune 500 companies. 
Policyholders can now find coverage to match a broad array of cyber risks, 
ranging from liability and costs associated with data breaches to business 
interruption losses and even tangible property damage caused by cyber 
events.  
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Cyber insurance cannot protect your institutions from a cyber incident any 
more than flood insurance can save your house from a storm surge or D&O 
insurance can prevent a lawsuit. But what cyber risk insurance can do is 
provide some measure of financial support in case of a data breach or cyber 
incident. And, significantly, cyber risk insurance and the associated 
underwriting processes can also help bolster your other cybersecurity 
controls. Qualifying for cyber risk insurance can provide useful information 
for assessing your bank’s risk level and identifying cybersecurity tools and 
best practices that you may be lacking.   
I have been asking our insurance and cyber experts at Treasury to think 
about how to encourage an environment where market forces create 
insurance products that enhance cybersecurity for businesses. Ideally, we 
can imagine the growth of the cyber insurance market as a mechanism that 
bolsters cyber hygiene for banks across the board.  
5. Do we engage in basic cyber hygiene? Here I am referring to ensuring 
that your bank engages in fundamental practices to bolster the security and 
resilience of your networks and systems. What exactly does this mean? 
Things like: Knowing all the devices connected to your networks. Knowing 
what is running—or attempting to run—on your networks. Knowing who 
has administrative permissions to change, bypass, or override system 
configurations and then reducing that number to only those who need those 
privileges. And also: patching software on a timely basis, and conducting 
continuous, automated vulnerability assessments and remediation. The 
Center for Internet Security, working with others including the Department 
of Homeland Security, launched the Cyber Hygiene Campaign in April 
[2014]. By some estimates, engaging in basic cyber hygiene will prevent 80 
percent of all known attacks. This is the basic “blocking and tackling” that 
doesn’t take a computer wizard to understand. 
Information Sharing 
… By information sharing, I’m referring to the sharing of timely, actionable 
information regarding cyber vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents with a 
view toward limiting attacks and stopping contagion across systems, 
networks, and other institutions. We know that the most effective defenses 
do not happen in isolation. Instead, the banks most sophisticated in cyber 
defense are those that play an active role in the information-sharing 
community, which leads us to the sixth question you should be asking… 
6. Do we share incident information with industry groups? If so, when 
and how does this occur? When bad actors attack one bank, it is possible—
and increasingly likely—that those actors or others will use the same or 
similar methods to target other institutions. We saw this play out earlier this 
year during the attack on JP Morgan Chase’s systems. That attack was not 
limited to JP Morgan Chase, but reportedly targeted other institutions as 
well.  
Sharing knowledge of vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents allows banks to 
benefit from the experience of others. This benefit is more acute today, 
when banks act as correspondents and comprise an interconnected system; 
and when an intrusion at one bank may quickly enable an intrusion at 
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another… 
Response and Recovery 
…Given the sheer number and continual morphing of assaults, we know 
that a goal of avoiding every attack is currently “pie-in-the-sky,” so instead 
we have to increasingly focus our efforts on making response and recovery 
more efficient, effective, and predictable.  
7. Do we have a cyber-incident playbook and who is the point person 
for managing response and recovery? Whether it is a stand-alone 
document or part of a larger business continuity and disaster recovery plan, 
your bank should consider having a detailed, documented plan that 
designates who is responsible for leading the response-and-recovery 
efforts; and that individual, as well as the entire organization, should know 
his or her authority. The person you choose to lead this effort should have 
exceptional organizational and communication skills because he or she will 
quarterback internal and external interactions.  
8. What roles do senior leaders and the board play in managing and 
overseeing the cyber incident response? The CEO and the board have to 
understand what their respective roles will be in the event of a significant 
cyber incident at the bank or in an adjacent sector such as energy or 
telecommunications that might significantly affect the bank. This means 
clearly understanding when and which matters get escalated to the CEO. It 
also means understanding whether the full board or a committee—like risk 
or audit—is initially tasked to oversee the response from a governance 
perspective. Attacks can create confusion and fear, but the damage can be 
vastly minimized if leaders clearly understand their roles in response and 
attack mitigation.  
To practice those roles, it makes sense for banks to participate in cyber 
exercises that simulate a cyber intrusion. These exercises allow CEOs, 
directors, and other key players to figure out how they will navigate the 
pressures and problems that come from the intrusion.  
The Treasury is developing an exercise regime designed to test 
communication and decision-making during cyber incidents, an effort that 
will involve institutions from across the financial sector as well as 
departments and agencies throughout government. Likewise many trade 
associations regularly organize cybersecurity exercises… Think of these 
exercises as complicated fire drills; proactive engagement with regulators 
and law enforcement through these exercises helps to better prepare your 
banks for actual attacks.  
9. When and how do we engage with law enforcement after a breach? 
It is important to remember that most cybersecurity breaches are crimes, 
some of which are crimes in progress. As such, your cyber-incident 
playbook should contemplate when, based on the data gathered, you should 
reach out to law enforcement. Because many of you may not have had 
reason to reach out to federal law enforcement agencies who specialize in 
cyber-crimes, we recommend that financial institution leaders—at banks of 
all sizes—cultivate relationships with local U.S. Secret Service and FBI 
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field offices. These teams are spread out across the country, and have 
personnel dedicated to cybersecurity. This relationship-building should 
start now if it hasn’t already, before a cyber event is unfolding. If you need 
help making those connections, our team will facilitate those introductions.  
10. After a cyber incident, when and how do we inform our customers, 
investors, and the general public? Transparency is key. To instill trust 
and confidence, the messages you communicate should avoid technical 
jargon and legalese and provide clear and consistent information. In 
addition, for those organizations that are public companies, you will have 
additional considerations regarding the timing and content of your 
disclosure if the breach is considered material information. These are some 
reasons why having draft messages for various scenarios is an important 
part of your bank’s playbook, given the possibility that events may be 
serious and fast-moving.217  
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CONCLUSION 
Now more than ever, governance of cybersecurity risk requires 
continuous education and vigilance. In cyberspace, barbarians are 
always at the gate. This article attempts to explore the unusually 
complex subject of cybersecurity in a readable manner. Many of the 
most significant cyber breaches to date and have been examined. Next, 
recent governmental policy initiatives, including President Obama’s 
Executive Order 13636 and related Treasury Department report, the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and NIST Framework have 
been reviewed. Important tools are available to improve the quality of 
discussion between boards, management, and information technology 
executives: the SANS Critical Security Controls; OWASP Top Ten; 
CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors; resources from 
the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) and U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT); and the U.S. Treasury’s list of ten ways to improve 
cybersecurity. Hopefully, these suggestions about what top managers 
and boards can do to improve cyber awareness and readiness will result 
in meaningful progress toward strengthening cybersecurity 
governance. 
